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Abstract. A generalized predictive analysis technique is proposed for
detecting violations of safety properties from apparently successful exe-
cutions of multithreaded programs. Speciﬁcally, we provide an algorithm
to monitor executions and, based on observed causality, predict other
schedules that are compatible with the run. The technique uses a weak
happens-before relation which orders a write of a shared variable with all
its subsequent reads that occur before the next write to the variable. A
permutation of the observed events is a possible execution of a program
if and only if it does not contradict the weak happens-before relation.
Even though an observed execution trace may not violate the given spec-
iﬁcation, our algorithm infers other possible executions (consistent with
the observed execution) that violate the given speciﬁcation, if such an
execution exists.
1 Introduction
In multithreaded systems, threads can execute concurrently communicating with
each other through a set of shared variables, creating the potential for subtle
errors. The large number of potential interleavings make it infeasible to check
all possible executions before deployment. We have been developing methods to
improve the software testing by automatically translating formal speciﬁcations
into monitors which detect potential violations of the speciﬁed properties. In
this paper, we develop a more powerful technique which improves the eﬃcacy of
monitors by allowing them to infer violations of properties that do not occur in
the observed execution but may occur in some other closely related execution.
Unlike model checking, predictive monitoring is not comprehensive. However,
it is far more eﬃcient than model checking because it does not execute the
program but relies only on the information that is already available in a run-time
execution. Speciﬁcally, we use a relatively weak semantic precedence relation to
cluster events into equivalence classes. We then allow permutations of these
equivalence classes and show how these permutations can be used to determine
the eﬀect of a large number of alternate schedules of threads.
Example. Consider an execution of the multithreaded program in Figure 1 for
airplane landing. Suppose in an execution, one thread (t2) in the program sets
Initially permit=f and landing=f;
Thread t1: Thread t2:
permit=checkTower(); permit=f;
if(permit)
landing=t
else
landing=f
t1
write(permit= t)
read(permit)
write(landing= t)
e1
e2
e3
write(permit= f)
t2
e'
Actual Execution
e1
e'
e4
e2
t1 t2
Un inferredInferred
e1
e'
e3
e2
t1 t2
Fig. 1. Time increases downward and is assumed to be the same across the threads.
the variable permit to false (event e′). Another thread (t1) in the program
checks with the control tower to see if the plane has permission to land. It then
sets a variable permit to true (event e1). At a subsequent point, the thread
t1 reads the variable permit (event e2), checks if permit is true, and sets the
variable landing to true (event e3).
Suppose we want to check that the property that if landing then immediately
before permit holds. For the observed execution e′, e1, e2, e3, the property holds.
However, since there is no causal connection between e′ and e1, and they are
executed by diﬀerent threads, we may permute these writes. Permuting only the
writes would require us to actually execute the program along a diﬀerent path
(as in model checking). This would be ineﬃcient and generally not feasible at
runtime. We avoid doing so by requiring all associated reads to also be permuted.
This allows us to construct an alternate execution path, e1, e2, e′, e3 and the
monitor infers that the property could be violated at e3 and produces the trace
as a witness.
Observe that, given the semantics of the program, the order of events could
also have been: e1, e′, e2, .. in which case landing would never be set to true.
We do not infer this path because doing so would require actually running the
program with a diﬀerent schedule (or semantically analyzing it) to determine
which event happens instead of e3. In particular, this means that violations
of some properties may never be detected. For example, consider the property
that if landing is modiﬁed then landing is true or always in the past permit
was false. This property is not violated by either the execution we observed,
nor the alternate execution we constructed. However, it would be violated by
the execution trace e1, e′, e2, .. and a model checker could detect this and our
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method could not, unless a related trace was one of the test cases. However, we
show that our generalized analysis can very eﬃciently uncover many errors that
standard testing would not with the same set of test cases.
2 Related Work
A number of runtime monitoring tools have been developed. These tools include
NASA’s JPaX [10], University of Pennsylvania’s Java-MaC [13], Bell Labs’
PET [9], and the commercial analysis systems Temporal Rover and DBRover
[6, 7]. Our work builds on experience with related techniques and tools–namely,
Java PathExplorer (JPaX) [10] and its sub-system Eagle [2]. These tools
treat the execution of a program essentially as a ﬂat, sequential trace of events
or states. We proposed predictive runtime analysis in [17, 18]. The technique was
based on checking a speciﬁcation against executions that are causally consistent
with a given execution – i.e., executions that do not permute writes to the same
shared variable.
In this work we extend the strength of our predictive ability by abstracting
a multithreaded computation in terms of two novel relations: weak-happens-
before relation and atomicity relation on post-write set of read events. As a
consequence of abstracting multithreaded computation in this way, we are able
increase the coverage of the runtime analysis of multithreaded programs by being
able to predict more valid multithreaded runs from a given single execution. In
particular, in the example described above, our previous technique would not
have detected a violation of our speciﬁcation.
3 Monitors for Safety Properties
Safety properties form an important class of properties in monitoring. This is
because once a system violates a safety property, there is no way to continue its
execution to satisfy the safety property later. Therefore, a monitor for a safety
property can precisely say at runtime when the property has been violated, so
that an external recovery action can be taken. From a monitoring perspective,
what is needed from a safety formula is a succinct representation of its bad
preﬁxes, which are ﬁnite sequences of states leading to a violation of the prop-
erty. Therefore, one can abstract away safety properties by languages over ﬁnite
words. Nondeterministic automata are a standard means to succinctly represent
languages over ﬁnite words. We next deﬁne a suitable version of automata, called
monitor, with the property that it has a “bad” state from which it never exits:
Definition 1. Let E be a ﬁnite or inﬁnite set, that can be thought of as the set
of events generated by the program to monitor. Then an E-monitor or simply a
monitor, is a tuple Mon = 〈M,m0, b, ρ〉, where
– M is the set of states of the monitor;
– m0 ∈M is the initial state of the monitor;
– b ∈M is the ﬁnal state of the monitor, also called bad state; and
– ρ : M×E → 2M is a non-deterministic transition relation with the property
that ρ(b, e) = {b} for any e ∈ E.
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Sequences in E, where  is the empty one, are called (execution) traces. A trace
π is said to be a bad preﬁx in Mon iﬀ b ∈ ρ({m0}, π), where ρ : 2M × E →
2M is recursively deﬁned as ρ(M, ) = M and ρ(M,πe) = ρ(ρ(M,π), e), where
ρ : 2M×E → 2M is deﬁned as ρ({m}∪M, e) = ρ(m, e)∪ρ(M, e) and ρ(∅, e) = ∅,
for all ﬁnite M ⊆M and e ∈ E.
The deﬁnition of monitor is similar to that given in [18], except that a mon-
itor is now interpreted over a sequence of events, rather than states, generated
by the program. As seen later in the paper, this modiﬁcation allows us to sig-
niﬁcantly increase the predictive power of our technique when analyzing the
computation lattice, or the abstract computation model, that will automatically
be constructed from an observed multithreaded execution.
M is not required to be ﬁnite in the above deﬁnition, but 2M represents the
set of ﬁnite subsets of M. In practical situations it is often the case that the
monitor is not explicitly provided in a mathematical form as above. For example,
a monitor can be just any program whose execution is triggered by receiving
events from the monitored program; its state can be given by the values of its
local variables, and the bad state has some easy to detect property, such as a
speciﬁc variable having a negative value. There are fortunate situations in which
monitors can be automatically generated from formal speciﬁcations [16, 11, 2],
thus requiring the user to focus on system’s formal safety requirements rather
than on low level implementation details.
Example 1. Let us consider the program given in Figure 2. It consists of two
threads t1 and t2 accessing the variables x, y, and z. Let the safety property
that we want to monitor be “if x becomes positive then eventually in the past
x became negative” which can be written in past-time temporal logic as the
formula F = p → ♦· q, where p represents the event that x becomes positive and
q represents the event that x becomes negative. The monitor automaton for this
formula is given in Figure 2. State 4 in this automaton represents the bad state.
Suppose that one runs the program and observes the execution t1: x=-1; t1:
z=x+3; t2: x=1; t2: y=x+z; in that order; then, the safety property is not
violated for this execution. Moreover, with the “happens-before” relation given
in [17, 18] which disallows any permutation of two accesses of the same variable
except when both of them are reads, one cannot predict any other possible
valid run (obtained through a diﬀerent scheduling) that violates the property.
However, as shown later in this paper, our current approach allows an observer of
the execution above to predict another possible valid run that violates the safety
property, namely the one in which t2 executes ﬁrst. The interesting aspect here
is that the observer does not see the code, but only the ﬂat sequence of read and
write events of shared variables, time-stamped appropriately.
4 Abstracting Multithreaded Computations
A multithreaded program consists of n threads t1, t2, ..., tn that execute con-
currently and communicate with each other through a set of shared variables.
The computation of each thread is abstracted out in terms of events, while the
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Initially x=0, y=0, z=0;
Thread t1: Thread t2:
x = -1; x = 1;
z = x+3; y = x+z;
Propositions:     p : x becomes greater than 0
q : x becomes less than 0
r : any other event
Safety Property:  p q
Monitor:
1
32
4
p
p,q,r
p
q,r
q
r
.
Fig. 2. Two threads t1 and t2 and a monitor.
multithreaded computation is abstracted out in terms of a partial order ≺ on
events. There can be three types of events: an internal event, a read or a write
of a shared variable. Internal events can be reads or writes of local variables,
calling a function, the value of a variable crossing some threshold, etc. We use eji
to represent the jth event generated by thread ti since the start of its execution.
When the thread or position of an event is not important we can refer to it
generically, such as e, e′, etc.; we may write e ∈ ti when event e is generated by
thread ti. Let us ﬁx an arbitrary but ﬁxed multithreaded execution and let S be
the set of all variables that are shared by more than one thread in the execution.
We can deﬁne a special “happens-before” relation over the accesses to each
shared variable: we say e x-happens-before e′, written ex e′, iﬀ e is a write of
x and e′ is a read of x such that the latest write that happens-before e′ is e. In
other words, we say that exe′ if and only if the value of x read by event e′ is the
value written by the event e on variable x. This can be realized by maintaining
a counter for each shared variable, which is incremented at each variable write.
If the value of the counter at the read event e′ of x is same as the counter value
after the write event e of x, we say that ex e′. Let Ei denote the set of events
of thread ti and let E denote
⋃
i Ei. Also, let  ⊆ E × E be deﬁned as follows:
1. ee′ when e and e′ are events of the same thread and e happens immediately
before e′;
2. e e′ whenever there is an x ∈ S with ex e′.
The partial order ≺ is the transitive closure of the relation . Let  be the
transitive, reﬂexive closure of . We say e||e′ if e 	 e′ and e′ 	 e, i.e., the
events e and e′ are causally unrelated. The partial order ≺ captures a special
causal “happens-before” relation among the events in diﬀerent threads, which we
call weak-happens-before. This causality relation is called “weak” since it is less
constrained than the apparently more natural “happens-before” relation deﬁned
and investigated in [17, 18], which assumed that ex e′ also when e was a read
of x and e′ was a write of x or when both e and e′ were writes of x; we call the
causality in [18] apparently more natural since it captures exactly the common
intuition that any two unrelated read accesses to a variable can be permuted.
While the causality in [18] allowed JMPaX to have strong predictive capa-
bilities, the weak-happens-before causality considered in this paper signiﬁcantly
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increases the coverage of runtime analysis of multithreaded systems and implic-
itly the predictive strength of tools implementing it, by allowing more possible
runs to be inferred from just one observed execution of the system. All these pre-
dicted runs can occur under diﬀerent thread scheduling or interleavings, meaning
that the increase in coverage comes at no expense, that is, our technique is still
free of false alarms. The fact that there are more possible execution traces to
analyze must be clearly regarded as an advantage in the context of predictive
runtime analysis; if, in the context of a highly unsynchronized multithreaded
program, one ﬁnds the number of possible runs too large to analyze eﬀectively,
then one has the option to discard online as many of those “uninteresting” runs
as needed. JMPaX already provides this functionality by allowing its users to
tune an analysis breadth “knob”, ranging from only one possible execution (the
observed one), like in testing, to all possible executions, like in model-checking.
Unlike in [18], the weak-happens-before relation above is not suﬃcient to
completely describe the multithreaded computation; if e and e′ are two events
such that ex e′ and e′′ is another event writing x such that e′′||e and e′′||e′, one
cannot interleave e′′ between e and e′. This is because if e′′ happens in between e
and e′, then by the deﬁnition of x, it is the case that e′′x e′, which contradicts
e′′||e′. This observation suggests that given a write event, say e, of x, the set
{e} ∪ {e′ | e′ ∈ E ∧ e x e′} should be regarded as atomic with respect to any
other event outside the set that reads or writes x. Such a set is called an atomic
set for the variable x. Therefore, each atomic set of x ∈ S contains exactly one
write and the corresponding reads. Any set which is a proper subset of an atomic
set is called an incomplete atomic set. The atomic sets deﬁne another relation,
called atomicity relation over the set of events E. We say that two events e and e′
are x-atomically related, denoted by e x e′, if and only if e and e′ belong to the
same “atomic set” for the variable x. Formally, e x e′ if an only if there exists
an event e′′ such that both e and e′ belong to the set {e′′} ∪ {e′′′ | e′′ x e′′′}.
Therefore, x is an equivalence relation on E. Let [e]x denote the corresponding
atomic equivalence class of an event e ∈ E.
The structure described by C = (E,≺,) is called a multithreaded computa-
tion. A possible linearization of the events in E is consistent with ≺ if for any
two events e and e′ in E, e ≺ e′ implies that e appears before e′ in the lin-
earization. Similarly, a linearization of the events in E is consistent with  if for
any two events e and e′ and an arbitrary shared variable x, e x e′ implies that
any other access (read or write) event e′′ of x, such that e′′ 	x e, appears either
before or after both e and e′ in the linearization. Combining the two conditions,
we say that a linearization of the events E is consistent with a multithreaded
computation C = (E,≺,) if and only if it is consistent with both ≺ and .
Any such linearization of events consistent with the multithreaded computation
is called a consistent multithreaded run, or simply, a multithreaded run.
A multithreaded computation can be thought of as the most general assump-
tion that an observer of the multithreaded execution can make about the system
without knowing what it is supposed to do. Indeed, an external observer sim-
ply cannot disregard the order in which the same variable is modiﬁed and used
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within the observed execution, because this order can be part of the semantics
of the multithreaded program. However, multiple consecutive writes of the same
variable can be permuted provided that the set of a write and all reads following
the write occur atomically. As seen in Section 6, by allowing an observer to an-
alyze multithreaded computations rather than just multithreaded executions, one
gets the beneﬁt of predicting errors from analyzing successful executions, errors
which can occur under a diﬀerent thread scheduling.
5 Capturing Multithreaded Computations
To capture and transmit to an external observer the weak-happens-before and
atomicity relations in a multithreaded computation, we use data-structures such
as vector clocks and atomicity identiﬁers, respectively, as explained below. The
algorithm based on vector clocks, which correctly and eﬃciently implements the
weak-happens-before relation, is motivated by our previous work [17, 18] and
related work [8, 3, 14, 1]. However, the vector clock algorithm described in this
paper diﬀers from the algorithms described in previous works, because our focus
here is to implement a diﬀerent, less usual but more powerful w.r.t. monitoring
“happens-before” relation. Let a vector clock V : ThreadId → Nat be a partial
map from thread identiﬁers to natural numbers. We call such a map a dynamic
vector clock (DVC) because its partiality reﬂects the intuition that threads are
dynamically created and destroyed. To simplify the presentation, we assume that
each DVC V is a total map, where V [t] = 0 when V is not deﬁned on thread t.
We associate a DVC with every thread ti and denote it by Vi. Moreover,
we associate a DVC Vx with every shared variable x. All the DVCs Vi are kept
empty at the beginning of the computation, so they do not consume any space.
For DVCs V and V ′, we say that V ≤ V ′ if and only if V [j] ≤ V ′[j] for all j,
and we say that V < V ′ iﬀ V ≤ V ′ and there is some j such that V [j] < V ′[j];
also, max{V, V ′} is the DVC with max{V, V ′}[j] = max{V [j], V ′[j]} for each j.
Further, we associate a counter, called atomicity identiﬁer, with every shared
variable. Let cx denote the counter associated with a shared variable x. These
counters are initialized to 0. An atomicity counter associated with a variable
keeps track of its atomic sets. A set of events corresponding to a read or write
of x belong to an atomic set if and only if the atomicity identiﬁers associated
with the variable x at those events are the same.
At every event in the multithreaded computation the DVCs and the atomicity
identiﬁers are updated according to the following algorithm, which acts as a
program instrumentation technique to emit events to an external observer of the
system. If a thread ti with current DVC Vi processes event eki then
1. Vi[i] ← Vi[i] + 1;
2. if eki is a write of a shared variable x then
Vx ← Vi
cx ← cx + 1;
3. if eki is a read of a shared variable x then
Vi ← max{Vi, Vx};
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4. if eki is a read or write of a shared variable x
then send message 〈eki , i, Vi, x, cx〉 to observer
else send message 〈eki , i, Vi,⊥,−1〉 to observer.
Intuitively, at every write event of a shared variable x, the DVC of x is
updated with the DVC of the thread writing x. Thus, the thread passes its
current time-stamp to the variable. This ensures that every event of the thread ti
till eki happens before any event that reads the value written to x. The atomicity
identiﬁer is incremented by 1 to indicate that a new atomic set is starting; all
the following read events, before another write of the same variable, will share
the same atomicity identiﬁer. At a read event of a variable x, the DVC of the
reading thread is updated with the maximum of the DVC of the thread and
the DVC of the variable x. This ensures that the read event happens after any
previous event of the thread and the last write event of the variable x.
Theorem 1. After event eki is processed by thread ti,
a) Vi[j] equals the number of events of tj that “weak-happens-before” eki ; if j = i
then this number is k;
b) Vx[j] is the number of events of tj that “weak-happens-before” the most recent
write of x; if i = j and eki is a write of x then this number also includes e
k
i .
Therefore, if 〈e, i, V, x, c〉 and 〈e′, j, V ′, x′, c′〉 are messages sent by the algorithm,
then e ≺ e′ if and only if V [i] ≤ V ′[i]; if i and j are not given, then e ≺ e′ if
and only if V < V ′. Moreover, e x e′ if and only if x = x′ 	= ⊥ and cx = c′x′ .
Therefore, the code instrumentation algorithm above correctly implements
the weak-happens-before and the atomicity relations.
6 Runtime Model Generation and Predictive Analysis
We now consider what happens at the observer’s site, which receives messages
〈e, i, V, x, c〉 from the running multithreaded program, and which, because of
Theorem 1, can infer the weak-happens-before and atomicity relations on these
events. The observer can eﬀectively, online and in parallel. analyze all possible
interleavings of events that are consistent with the weak-happens-before and
atomicity relations. Only one of these corresponds to the real execution. Since
the other interleavings correspond to other possible executions, the presented
technique has the capability to predict violations from successful executions.
6.1 Multithreaded Computation Lattice
Inspired by [1, 17, 18], we show how to incrementally generate an abstract model
from a multithreaded computation, the computation lattice, with the properties:
(1) every path in the computation lattice corresponds to a consistent multi-
threaded run; (2) every node in the computation lattice represents a set of events
that can be observed as a preﬁx of a consistent multithreaded run. Our purpose
in this paper is to check safety requirements against all multithreaded runs of a
system by systematically and eﬃciently exploring the computation lattice.
Let us ﬁx an arbitrary multithreaded computation C = (E,≺,). Let eki be
the kth event generated by the thread ti since the start of its execution. A cut
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Σ is a subset of E such that for all i ∈ [1, n], if eki ∈ Σ then eli ∈ Σ for all l < k.
Let Σk1k2...kn denote the cut containing the latest events ek11 , e
k2
2 , . . . , e
kn
n from
each of the threads. If a thread i has not seen any event then ki is considered 0.
Definition 2 (Consistent Cut). A cut Σ is consistent if for all e, e′ ∈ E,
(a) if e ∈ Σ and e′ ≺ e then e′ ∈ Σ, and
(b) if e, e′ ∈ Σ and e 	x e′ for some x ∈ S, then [e]x ⊆ Σ or [e′]x ⊆ Σ.
(a) says that a consistent cut is closed under the weak-happens-before re-
lation, and (b) says that a consistent cut can contain at most one incomplete
atomic set for any shared variable. Indeed, if (b) fails, then there is no way to
reorder the remaining events in E −Σ without violating the atomicity relation.
Definition 3. An event eli is enabled for a consistent cut Σ = Σ
k1k2...kn iﬀ
(a) l = ki + 1,
(b) for all events e ∈ E, if e ≺ eli then e ∈ Σ, and
(c) if eli is an access (read or write) event of an x ∈ S and e is any access event
of x in Σ then either eli ∈ [e]x or [e]x ⊆ Σ.
Since eli can be in at most one atomic set for a given shared variable, the
above actually says that eli can be safely considered a next event in the execution.
Indeed, the following can be regarded as an equivalent deﬁnition of enabledness:
Proposition 1. eli is enabled for a consistent Σ iﬀ Σ ∪ {eli} is also consistent.
Definition 4. If Σ = Σk1k2...kn is consistent and eli is enabled for Σ, then let
δ(Σ, eli) denote the consistent cut Σ ∪ {eli}, that is, Σk1k2...ki−1(ki+1)ki+1...kn .
Therefore, δ maps a consistent cut Σ and a corresponding enabled event e
into another consistent cut, which can be regarded as the result of executing e
after executing all the events in Σ in some consistent way. Let ΣK0 = Σ00...0 be
the consistent cut at the beginning of the computation. Then
Proposition 2. A consistent multithreaded run e1e2 . . . e|E| generates a se-
quence of consistent cuts ΣK0ΣK1 . . . ΣK|E| such that for all r ∈ 1, |E|, ΣKr−1
is a consistent cut, er is enabled for ΣKr−1 , and δ(ΣKr−1 , er) = ΣKr .
From now on, we identify sequences ΣK0ΣK1 . . . ΣK|E| as above with multi-
threaded runs, and simply call them runs. We say that Σ leads-to Σ′, written
Σ  Σ′, when there is some run in which Σ and Σ′ are consecutive consistent
cuts. Let ∗ be the reﬂexive transitive closure of the relation . The set of all
consistent cuts together with the relation ∗ forms a lattice with n mutually
orthogonal axes representing each thread. For a consistent cut Σk1k2...kn , we call
k1 + k1 + · · · kn its level. A path in the lattice is a sequence of consistent cuts
where the level increases by 1 between any two consecutive consistent cuts in
the path. Therefore, a run is just a path starting with Σ00...0 and ending with
Σr1r2...rn , where ri is the total number of events of thread ti in the multithreaded
computation. This lattice, called computation lattice, can be regarded as an ab-
stract model of the running multithreaded program. If one was able to store such
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Fig. 3. Successful Execution and Computation Lattice.
a computation lattice, a non-trivial matter since it can be exponential in the
length of the execution, one could model-check it against the safety property.
Figure 3 shows the weak-happens-before and atomicity relations on the events
generated by the multithreaded execution in Example 1, together with the cor-
responding computation lattice. The rectangular boxes enclose the atomic sets
{e11, e21}, {e31, e32}, and {e12, e22}. The actual execution is marked with solid edges in
the lattice. It can be readily seen that the temporal property deﬁned in Example
1 holds on the actual execution of the program, but that it is violated on some
other consistent run represented by the sequence of events e12, e
2
2, e
1
1, e
2
1, e
3
1, e
3
2, e
4
2.
6.2 Level By Level Analysis of the Computation Lattice
A naive observer of a multithreaded program would just check the observed
execution trace against the monitor for the safety property, sayMon, and would
maintain at each moment a set of states, say MonStates, in Mon. When a new
event e arrives, it would replace MonStates by ρ(MonStates, e). If the bad state b
occurs in MonStates then a property violation error would be reported, meaning
that the current execution trace led to a bad preﬁx of the safety property. Here
we assume that the events are received in the order in which they are emitted.
A smart observer, as seen next, analyzes not only the observed execution
trace, but also all the other consistent runs of the multithreaded system, thus
being able to predict violations from successful executions. The observer receives
the events from the running program and enqueues them in an event queue Q.
At the same time, it traverses the computation lattice level-by-level and checks
whether the bad state of the monitor can be hit by any of the runs up to the
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current level. We next provide an algorithm that a smart observer can use to
construct and traverse the computation lattice.
The observer maintains a set of consistent cuts, (CurrLevel), that are present
in the current level of the lattice. For each event e in Q, it tries to construct
a new consistent cut from the set of consistent cuts in the current level and
the event e. If the consistent cut is created successfully then it is added to the
set of consistent cuts (NextLevel) for the next level of the lattice. The process
continues until no more consistent cut can be created for the next level. At that
time, the current level is complete and the observer starts constructing the next
level by setting CurrLevel to NextLevel and NextLevel to the empty set, and
reallocating the space occupied by CurrLevel. Fig. 4 shows the pseudo-code.
while(not empty(Q)){
monitorLevel()
}
State cut(Σ,m,Q){
create Σ′ such that
VC(Σ′) = VC(Σ)
and AI(Σ′) = AI(Σ)
let m is of the form 〈e, i, V, x, c〉
VC(Σ′)[i] ← VC(Σ)[i] + 1
if c ≥ 0 and
∃〈e′, i′, V ′, x, c′〉 ∈ Q such that
V ′ ≤ max(VC(Σ), V ) and c = c′{
AI(Σ′)[x] ← c
}
for each s ∈M(Σ){
M(Σ′) ←M(Σ′) ∪ ρ(s, e)
if b ∈M(Σ′)
output ′property violated′}
return Σ′
}
boolean monitorLevel(){
for each m ∈ Q and Σ ∈ CurrLevel{
if enabled(Σ,m) {
NextLevel← NextLevel unionmulti cut(Σ,m,Q)}}
Q ← removeUselessMessages(CurrLevel, Q)
CurrLevel← NextLevel
NextLevel← ∅
}
boolean enabled(Σ,m){
let m is of the form 〈e, i, V, x, c〉
if not(∀j = i : VC(Σ)[j] ≥ V [j] and
VC(Σ)[i] + 1 = V [i]) return false
if c ≥ 0 and AI(Σ)[x] ≥ 0 and AI(Σ)[x] = c{
return false
}
return true
}
Fig. 4. Level-by-level traversal.
Every consistent cut Σ contains a set of monitor statesM(Σ), a DVC VC (Σ)
to represent the latest events from each thread that resulted in that consistent
cut, and an atomic identiﬁer map AI(Σ) that maps every shared variable x to
the atomic identiﬁer corresponding to the incomplete atomic set in Σ for x ∈ S,
if it exists, or to -1 if there is no incomplete atomic set for x in Σ. The predicate
enabled(Σ,m), checks if the event e contained in the message m is enabled in
the consistent cut Σ. For that, it ﬁrst checks if for every event e′ ∈ Σ, e′ ≺ e,
by comparing the DVCs. If this is not the case then enabled(Σ,m) returns false.
Otherwise, it checks if the atomic identiﬁer of e matches the atomic identiﬁer of
the incomplete atomic set, if it exists, for the shared variable x. If this is not the
case, then enabled(Σ,m) returns false; otherwise returns true. The correctness of
the function follows from Theorem 1 and the deﬁnition of enabledness of an event
for a consistent cut. It essentially says that event e can generate a consecutive
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consistent cut from the consistent cut Σ iﬀ Σ “knows” everything e knows about
the current evolution of the multithreaded system except for the event e itself.
Note that e may know less than Σ knows with respect to the evolution of other
threads in the system, because Σ has global information.
The function cut(Σ,m,Q), which implements the function δ in 4, creates
a new consistent cut Σ′, as the consistent cut resulting from Σ after adding
the event e of message m. It ﬁrst copies the DVC and the atomic identiﬁer map
associated with Σ to Σ′. Then it increments the ith element of the DVC of Σ′ and
updates the atomic identiﬁer map of Σ′ for variable x with the atomic identiﬁer
of e if Σ′ still contains an incomplete atomic set for x. For every monitor state s
in M(Σ), it applies the monitoring function ρ to s and e and adds the resulting
states in the set M(Σ′). After the update, if M(Σ′) contains the bad state b
then a ‘property violated’ error is raised.
The merging operation nextLevel unionmulti Σ adds the consistent cut Σ to the set
nextLevel. If Σ is already present in nextLevel, it updates the existing cut’s Mon-
States with the union of the existing state’s MonStates and the Monstates of Σ.
Two consistent cuts are same if their DVCs are equal. The function removeUse-
lessMessages(CurrLevel,Q) removes from Q all the messages that cannot con-
tribute to the construction of any cut at the next level. To do so, it creates a
DVC Vmin whose each component is the minimum of the corresponding compo-
nent of the DVCs of all the consistent cuts in the set CurrLevel. It then removes
all the messages in Q whose DVCs are less than or equal to Vmin. This function
makes sure that we do not store any unnecessary messages.
6.3 Handling Synchronization Constructs
In Java, one can synchronize blocks of statements by using the keyword
synchronize with an object over which the block is synchronized. When the
execution enters the synchronized block, it acquires the lock associated with the
object and releases the lock when it exits the block. The main goal of synchro-
nization is to attain atomicity: if two synchronized blocks over the same lock are
executed by two diﬀerent threads, then their execution cannot be interleaved.
This atomicity can be naturally achieved in our approach by generating dummy
write and read events of the lock variable when the lock is acquired or released,
respectively. In particular, since in Java synchronized blocks holding the same
lock cannot be interleaved, so corresponding events cannot be permuted, locks
are considered shared variables and a write event of a lock is generated whenever
a lock is acquired, and a read event of the lock is generated whenever a lock is
released. This way, we make a block holding a lock atomic with respect to any
other block holding the same lock, thus avoiding reporting any false alarms.
7 Application to Data-Race Detection
Since the predictive runtime analysis approach discussed in the previous sections
is parameterized by a very generic concept of monitor as a nondeterministic
ﬁnite state machine of bad preﬁxes, it can be applied to predict violations of
requirements speciﬁcations given in a variety of formalisms. Temporal logics and
regular expressions are just special cases. In particular, our technique can be
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used as a complementary approach to model-checking, when the total number
of states to be model-checked is prohibitively large. As shown in [18], predictive
runtime analysis techniques like the one in this paper can be tuned to analyze
from one execution trace, the observed one, to all the consistent executions.
We next discuss another interesting application of our runtime analysis tech-
nique, namely in predicting data-races from data-race-free executions. The idea
is to specify some simple temporal logic formulae, which, if violated, imply the
existence of data-races in a multithreaded computation. A data-race occurs when
two threads access a shared variable simultaneously without any synchronization
and at least one of the accesses is a write. Data-races can lead to very unexpected
behaviors of concurrent systems, and are notorious for their diﬃculty to detect.
Plain testing can easily escape data-races, due to their dependency on thread-
scheduling. For example, suppose that two threads increment a shared variable
x simultaneously by executing statements x++ without any synchronization. If
the initial value of x is 0 then at the end of the execution the value of x can be
1 or 2. The later is obviously wrong, but hard to catch during testing.
It has been broadly recognized that tools capable of detecting data-races
automatically in programs at runtime can be very valuable. There has been
a substantial eﬀort dedicated to developing tools and techniques that detect
data-races online, such as those based on “happens-before” relations over locks
[5], or those based on locksets, such as Eraser [15]. We next show how one can
use our predictive runtime analysis technique to precisely detect data-races in
a way somewhat similar to [5]. An advantage of our technique over the for-
mer approaches based on “happens-before” causality, such as the one in [5],
is that we can permute two synchronized blocks holding the same lock due
to our less constrained weak-happens-before relation. For example, if one sees
the execution trace t1: z=1; t1: lock(l); t1: x=0; t1: unlock(l); t2:
lock(l); t2: y=10; t2: unlock(l); t2: z=0;, then the “happens-before”
data-race detection algorithm in [5] cannot detect the potential data-race over
the variable z. However, it is easy to see that our approach can construct
the consistent run t2: lock(l); t2: y=10; t2: unlock(l); t2: z=0; t1:
z=1; t1: lock(l); t1: x=0; t1: unlock(l); that exhibits the data-race
over z. Moreover, since we do the analysis at runtime, we can take a necessary
recovery action whenever we ﬁnd a data-race.
We conservatively say that two accesses of a shared variable x, of which at
least one is a write, by two threads are in data-race conﬂict, if one can permute
events consistently with the multithreaded computation such that the two ac-
cesses become consecutive events. Using our predictive monitoring approach, one
can detect such data-race conﬂicts by monitoring the following simple property
for every shared variable x and for every pair of threads ti and tj :
(write(x, ti) → ¬ write(x, tj)) ∧(write(x, ti) → ¬ read(x, tj))
∧(read(x, ti) → ¬ write(x, tj))
where the temporal operator F means “F holds at the previous event”, the
events read(x, t) (or write(x, t)) are generated whenever the thread t reads (or
writes) x. The ﬁrst conjunct in the formula states the absence of write-write data-
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races. A write-write data-race happens if there is a consistent run in which two
diﬀerent threads write a variable x consecutively. Similarly, the second and the
third conjunct state the absence of write-read and read-write data-races. Using
our approach, by monitoring the above formulae, one can detect data-races in
multithreaded programs precisely, that is, without false positives.
8 Implementation
We have implemented this novel predictive runtime analysis technique as part
of version 3.0 of the tool Java MultiPathExplorer (JMPaX) [12], designed to
monitor multithreaded Java programs. The current implementation is written
in Java and it removes the previous limitation of version 2.0 that all the shared
variables are static and of type int. The tool has three main modules, the
instrumentation module, the observer module and the monitor module.
The instrumentation module takes a speciﬁcation ﬁle and a list of class ﬁles as
command line arguments, and it instruments each class ﬁle provided as argument
to send messages to the observer module whenever a relevant read, write, or
internal event occurs at runtime. The instrumentation module uses the BCEL
Java library [4] to modify Java class ﬁles.
The observer module generates the lattice level-by-level as the events are re-
ceived from the instrumented program. The monitor module reads the require-
ments speciﬁcation ﬁle, currently using either linear temporal logic or regular
expression formalism, and generates the non-deterministic monitor correspond-
ing to the bad preﬁxes of the speciﬁcation. An implementation of the monitor
transition function ρ is provided as an interface method to the observer module.
This method raises an exception if at any point the set of states returned by ρ
contains the “bad” state of the monitor. The system being modular, the user
can plug in his/her own monitor module for his/her logic of choice.
9 Conclusion
We have developed a simple and eﬃcient technique to predict violations of safety
properties. The predictive monitoring algorithm described here signiﬁcantly gen-
eralizes previous work by extending the set of observations against which the
safety properties are checked. Our algorithm requires maintaining an atomic
identiﬁer map for every consistent cut. The size of this map is linearly propor-
tional to the number of shared variables. This can lead to consumption of a large
amount of memory space if the number of shared variables is large and slow down
the monitoring process. As an aside, this reinforces the view that avoiding unnec-
essary sharing of variables is good software practice; in this case, fewer variables
will improve the eﬃciency of monitoring (as well as reduce the chances of errors).
While our technique will not ﬁnd all errors, it can be applied to detect important
software errors such as unintended data-race conditions which may otherwise be
missed. The technique is, however, sound: it does not produce any false positives
(any errors predicted could actually occur in a diﬀerent execution).
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Appendix
If the paper is accepted, in the ﬁnal version the appendix will be removed
and an extended technical report version of the paper will be cited.
Proof of Proposition 1: Since C is a cut, all the events e1i , e
2
i , . . . , e
ki
i are in C.
Therefore, C ∪ {eli} contains all events emi , for m < l, if l = ki + 1. This implies
that C ∪ {eli} is a cut. Since C is a consistent cut, for all events e ∈ C, if e′ ≺ e
then e′ ∈ C. It is given that for all events e′ ≺ eli, e′ ∈ C. Therefore, for all events
e ∈ C ∪{eli}, if e′ ≺ e then e′ ∈ C. This is the ﬁrst condition for C ∪{eli} being a
consistent cut. Let e be any access event of x in C. Given that C is a consistent
cut, if eli ∈ [e]x then the second condition for the deﬁnition of consistent cut
continues to hold for C ∪ {eli} because the addition of eli to C cannot create a
new atomic set for x. Otherwise, if eli 	∈ [e]x then we know that [e]x ⊆ C. This
implies that [e]x ⊆ C ∪ {eli} or [eli]x ⊆ C ∪ {eli}. Hence, the second condition
for the deﬁnition of consistent cut holds for C ∪ {eli}. Since both the ﬁrst and
second conditions for the deﬁnition of consistent cut holds for the cut C ∪ {eli},
C ∪ {eli} is a consistent cut. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2: The proof is by induction on r. By deﬁnition ΣK0 is
a consistent cut. Moreover, it is easy to see that e1 is enabled in ΣK0 . Since
ΣK0 is a consistent cut and e1 is enabled in ΣK0 , δ(ΣK0 , e1) is deﬁned. Let
ΣK1 = δ(ΣK0 , e1).
Let us assume that ΣKr−1 is a consistent cut, er is enabled in ΣKr−1 , and
δ(ΣKr−1 , er) = ΣKr . Therefore, by Proposition 1, δ(ΣKr−1 , er) = ΣKr is also
a consistent cut. Let ΣKr = Σk1k2...kn and C = ΣKr . We want to prove that
er+1 is enabled in ΣKr . Let er+1 = eli for some i and l i.e. er+1 is the l
th event
of thread ti. For every event eki , such that k < l, e
k
i ≺ eli. Therefore, by the
deﬁnition of consistent run, in R, eki appears before e
l
i for all 0 < k < l. This
implies that all eki for 0 < k < l are included in C. Therefore, ki = l − 1. Thus
the ﬁrst condition for er+1 being enabled for ΣKr is met. Since C is a consistent
cut, for all events e and e′, if e 	= eli then (e ∈ C∪{eli})∧(e′ ≺ e) → e′ ∈ C∪{eli}.
Otherwise, if e = eli then by the deﬁnition of consistent run, if e
′ ≺ eli then e′
appears before eli in R. This implies that e
′ is included in C ∪ {eli}. Therefore,
for all events e and e′, if e ∈ C ∪ {eli} and e′ ≺ e then e′ ∈ C ∪ {eli}. Thus
the second condition for er+1 being enabled for ΣKr is met. Let er+1 be access
event of a shared variable x. Let e be an event in the incomplete atomic set (if
exists) for x in C. If e x er+1, the third condition for the enabledness of an
event is not violated. If e 	x er+1 and ∃e′ ∈ E − (C ∪ {eli}) such that e x e′
then any run that extends e1e2 . . . er+1 will be inconsistent with respect to the
“atomicity” relation. Therefore, if e 	x er+1 then [e]x ⊆ C ∪ {er+1}. Thus the
third condition for er+1 being enabled for ΣKr is met. Therefore, we proved that
er+1 is enabled for the consistent cut ΣKr . Since, ΣKr is a consistent cut and
er+1 is enabled in ΣKr , δ(ΣKr , er+1) is deﬁned. We let δ(ΣKr , er+1) = ΣKr+1 .
unionsq
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